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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of South Africa under Dutch and British colonial rule has
consisted of the subjugation of indigenous people by the white minority.1
This systematic discrimination was formalized under an apartheid regime
that imposed a hierarchical structure influenced by racism and the selfcreated privilege of white South Africans.2 Racial segregation under this
political system ran deeper than separate schools and restrooms.3 The
segregation compromised black South Africans’ access to necessities
such as housing, water, and electricity.4
However, recent transitions in the South African government have
provided some relief for the poor black population. In 1992, the apartheid
regime began transitioning into a constitutional democracy.5 In this
year, South Africa held its last whites-only referendum in which South
Africans gave the government permission to work with black leaders in
an effort to draft a new constitution free of racial discrimination.6 In
1994, the African National Congress won the first non-racial election7
and Nelson Mandela became the country’s first black President.8 The
new Government of National Unity implemented a comprehensive plan
to enable greater economic and social development in South Africa,
aiming to support the overwhelming population of poor blacks.9
One of the new government’s first actions was to institute the
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).10 The government
implemented this policy framework to address the vast socioeconomic
problems lingering as a result of the transition from apartheid.11 Lack of
economic growth, enormous debt, and inequality among its citizens

1. See History of South Africa, ONE WORLD NATIONS ONLINE, http://www.
nationsonline.org/oneworld/History/South-Africa-history.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
2. See Andrew Marquard, Bernard Bekker, Anton Eberhard, & Trevor Gaunt,
South Africa’s Electrification Programme, an Overview and Assessment 7 (Graduate
School of Business, University of Cape Town, Working Paper, Dec. 2007), available at
http://www.gsb.uct.ac.za/files/ok.pdf.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See Christopher Sutton, Eskom and the United Nations Global Compact
Principles on Human Rights, in EMBEDDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN BUSINESS PRACTICE II 81,
81 (U.N. Global Impact ed., 2007).
6. Id.
7. This non-racial election was the first-ever election where black citizens could
vote. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 82.
11. Id.
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contributed to the dilapidated economic structure of South Africa.12
According to the RDP White Papers,13 “[a] programme is required that is
achievable, sustainable and meets the objectives of freedom, and an
improved standard of living and quality of life for all South Africans within
a peaceful and stable society characterised by equitable economic
growth.”14 The government acknowledged that the country could not
improve when such a large percentage of its population, particularly
black South Africans, was living in poverty.15
Apartheid had kept energy issues of the poor off the policy agenda.16
Interest in “energy poverty”17 issues did not emerge until the 1980s.18
To illustrate this point, in 1996, only 58% of the country’s population
lived in formal housing.19 Additionally, 97% of non-urban white households
had access to electricity, compared to 25% of non-urban black households.20
Therefore, the provision of sufficient housing, including running water
and electricity for cooking and lighting, was a prominent issue the
government needed to address.
Since coming into power in 1994, the government responded to these
issues by building 1.4 million housing units.21 This increase in housing
development provided secure homes for more than 5 million people.22
After building these homes, however, the government then faced the
12. Andrew Marquard, Bernard Bekker, Anton Eberhard, & Trevor Gaunt, South
Africa’s Electrification Programme: Policy, Institutional, Planning, Financing and
Technical Innovations, 36 ENERGY POLICY 3116, 3116–17 (Dec. 2007), available at http://
www.erc.uct.ac.za/Research/publications/08bekker-etal_electrification%20_programme.pdf.
13. The RDP White Papers lays out the Government’s plans, goals, and methods
of implementation of the RDP. See Parliament of The Republic of South Africa, General
Notice, White Paper on Reconstruction and Development, 353 GOV’T GAZETTE No. 16085
(Nov. 15, 1994), available at http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=70427.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 6.
16. See Marquard, supra note 12, at 3117.
17. Energy poverty is the lack of household access to modern energy services,
including electricity and clean cooking facilities. See Energy Poverty, INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, http://www.iea.org/topics/energypoverty/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
18. Marquard, supra note 12, at 3117.
19. Id. at 3115.
20. Id.
21. The Author travelled to South Africa in 2006, 2009, and 2011. During these
travels, she saw the evolution of homes from shanty town houses made of cardboard and
corrugated tin, to empty concrete structures without utilities, and finally to neighborhoods
comprised of well-built concrete homes with plumbing and electrical wires running
overhead. See also Houses for Everyone, SOUTHAFRICA.INFO, http://www.southafrica.info/
about/social/govthousing.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
22. Id.
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daunting task of supplying them with electricity. The cost of providing
this electricity has been borne on the backs of the minority white population
who have seen their electricity bills more than quadruple over a span of
8 years.23 In addition, the utility companies responded to the demand for
increased electricity by implementing a billing process that estimated the
amount of electricity the population would use.24 As a consequence,
electricity bills are usually over-estimated for this part of the white minority
population. Due to the over-estimations, customers must request refunds,
which often are available only after the customer has paid the overcharged bill and requests such return.25 As more South Africans continue to
demand electricity, these problems will only escalate. For the South
African government, attempting to solve one problem—the shortage of
adequate housing, had caused another problem—how to supply affordable
electricity to its population.
This Comment examines whether South Africa’s treaty obligations
conflict with the requirement of the country’s government to provide
electricity to a burgeoning home-owning population. Section II introduces
Eskom, South Africa’s largest utility company, which produces most of
the electricity used in South Africa and surrounding countries.26 Section
III discusses South Africa’s role in the Southern Africa Power Pool and
the additional obligations this membership places on the country.
Section IV then examines the controversial loan that South Africa
received from the World Bank to assist in building the Medupi coal-fired
power plant. Section V illustrates South Africa’s climate change obligations
imposed by its commitment to the United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change and the Millennium Development Goals the country
agreed to meet. Lastly, Section VI examines the relationship between
the World Bank loan for the Medupi coal-fired power plant and South
Africa’s treaty obligations to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
This Comment then proposes the establishment of regulations to reconcile
conflicting decisions or obligations of international institutions.
II. SOUTH AFRICA’S MONOPOLISTIC ELECTRICITY COMPANY: ESKOM
Eskom Holding Ltd. (Eskom) is a government-owned public utility
company in South Africa that generates and distributes electricity to

23. See infra Appendix A and B for a comparison of a Cape Town, South Africa
resident’s electricity bills from 2003 and 2011.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Company Information, ESKOM, http://www.eskom.co.za/c/40/companyinformation/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
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residential, industrial, mining, commercial, and agricultural customers.27
It is one of the top five utility companies in the world in terms of sales and
size.28 Eskom maintains a monopolistic hold on South Africa, currently
generating 95% of South Africa’s electricity.29 In addition, Eskom
generates nearly 45% of all electricity used in Africa.30
A series of events, most involving Eskom, led to the peak of South
Africa’s electricity problems. Beginning in the 1980s, South Africa
invested heavily in coal, a cheap form of energy, which enabled Eskom
to generate and distribute large amounts of electricity.31 The focus on
coal as a less expensive source of energy caused Eskom to disregard
alternate and off-grid32 energy supplies.33 This oversight was further
compounded by the failed privatization of Eskom in 1998, which resulted in
inadequate funding and the inability of the company to construct needed
power stations.34 In addition, the increased demand for electricity lowered
the country’s reserve margin35 to a level that threatened the country’s
ability to cope with maintenance or breakdowns of power plants that
were already running above capacity.36
These negative conditions resulted in an energy crisis from 2007
through 2008.37 Put simply, the demand for power was greater than the
available supply, and Eskom ran out of electricity to provide to South

27. Id.
28. Size refers to the percentage of energy supplied to South Africa and surrounding
countries. See ESKOM, ESKOM AS A GLOBAL CHANGE AGENT IN AFRICA 2 (July 26, 2000),
available at http://www.un.org/partners/business/gcevent/companies/pdf/eskom.pdf.
29. See Company Information, supra note 26.
30. Id.
31. See Dave Harcourt, Rolling Blackouts to Benefit South Africa, ECO LOCALIZER
(Oct. 18, 2008), http://ecolocalizer.com/2008/10/18/rolling-blackouts-to-benefit-southafrica/.
32. Off-grid energy refers to accessing electricity from avenues other than through
the main or national transmission grid. For example, rather than turning on electricity
supplied by Eskom or a similar utility company, a resident could use batteries to supply
its electricity. See Off-Grad Lighting, OFF-GRID, http://www.off-grid.net/2013/02/03/
off-grid-lighting/#more-44627 (last visited Feb. 5, 2013).
33. Id.
34. See FRANCOIS CALLDO, SOLIDARITY RESEARCH INST., ESKOM’S POWER CRISIS:
REASONS, IMPACT & POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 7 (2009), available at http://www.solidarity
research.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2010/07/13-Eskoms-power-crisis-Reasons-impactsolutions-Gewysig.pdf.
35. The reserve margin is the excess generation capacity over peak demand. Id. at
11.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 7–11.
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Africans. To cope with this problem, Eskom and the government
implemented a system of “load-shedding,” or government-scheduled
rolling blackouts at various intervals.38 The blackouts, or shutting off of
electricity, allowed Eskom to conserve the limited energy it was generating,
but at the expense of serving its customers’ needs.39
South Africa was not the only country affected by this energy crisis.
South Africa’s membership in the Southern Africa Power Pool (SAPP)
spread the impact of the crisis beyond its borders.40 Eskom provides
85% of the electricity traded in the SAPP.41 Therefore, the import and
export relationships between the SAPP countries caused the blackouts to
flow from South Africa to many surrounding countries.42
III. SOUTHERN AFRICA POWER POOL: SOUTH AFRICA’S ELECTRICAL
CONNECTION TO SOUTHERN AFRICA
The SAPP is an international power pool established in 1995 via the
Inter Governmental Memorandum of Understanding as a regional body
of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC).43 The SAPP
members created a common power grid and market in order to expand
electricity trade, lower energy costs, and ensure greater supply of electricity
to the utilities.44 The pool was structured by long-term bilateral contracts
for supply between countries, and these contracts were supplemented by
additional short-term contracts.45 The SAPP agreements must be
interpreted to comply with the SADC treaty and other SADC guidelines.46
In addition, disputes between power pool countries are settled via the
SADC Dispute Resolution Tribunal.47 The SAPP further consists of an
executive committee, three subcommittees, an operating subcommittee

38. See Harcourt, supra note 31.
39. Id.
40. See RABOBANK ECONOMIC RESEARCH DEPT., No. 2008/04, ENERGY CRISIS–
THE CASE OF SOUTH AFRICA (SPECIAL REPORT) 3 (2008).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See SUSTAINABLE DEV. DIV. OF THE U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR AFRICA,
ASSESSMENT OF POWER-POOLING ARRANGEMENTS IN AFRICA 39 (Oct. 2004). The SADC
is an inter-governmental organization located in Gaborone, Botswana. Southern African
Dev. Cmty., SADC Facts and Figures, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEV. CMTY., http://www.
sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-facts-figures/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2013). The organization
strives for regional integration and aims to ensure economic well-being of its member
countries, improve the standards of living and quality of life, and promote freedom and
social justice. Southern African Dev. Cmty., SADC Objectives, SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEV.
CMTY., http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-objectiv/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2013).
44. See SUSTAINABLE DEV. DIV., supra note 43, at 40.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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and its associated coordination center, and an environmental
subcommittee.48
As a member of the SAPP, each country must meet an Accredited
Capacity Obligation (ACO).49 This is a requirement that each utility
company subject to the ACO maintain sufficient capacity to meet
forecasted monthly peak demand.50 There are additional obligations of
members such as supplying emergency energy for at least six hours per
day and disclosing operational information and costs.51 The SAPP also
operates through a pricing arrangement that is set out in the countries’
operating agreements.52
Eskom represents South Africa in the SAPP and has played a
significant role in energy connections in the SAPP region.53 One of the
most important accomplishments of the SAPP was the MatimbaInsukamini interconnector built in October 1995.54 This was the first
linkage of electrical system operations between the north and south of
Southern Africa.55 As stated above, Eskom’s inability to provide electricity
during the high demand in 2007 and 2008 affected South Africans as
well as the countries relying on Eskom’s electricity imports and
contributions to the power pool. South Africa’s energy crisis, and its
corresponding effect on surrounding countries, indicated the need for
increased electricity generation, capacity, and security.
In a country already recovering from economic and social inequality
and political instability, these energy problems only intensified the
difficulty of stimulating the economy’s growth. The energy crisis of
2007 and 2008, and the extreme financial hardship that followed,
demonstrated that without immediate improvements to electricity
generation and supply, South Africa’s economy would suffer, energy
prices would increase for all—including the poor—and South Africa
would not be able to meet its obligations to neighboring countries.56 The

48. Id.
49. Id. at 43.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See U.N. Comm. on Sustainable Dev., South Africa Country Report, 14th
Sess., 6 (Sept. 2005).
54. This linked South Africa and Zimbabwe. Id. at 31.
55. Id.
56. See CALLDO, supra note 34, at 4; see also OGUNLADE DAVIDSON, NEIL HIRST,
& WILLIAM MOOMAW, RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE WORLD BANK GROUP ON LENDING
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government recognized that it would need financial assistance from
outside sources in order to recover financially and to improve
efficient energy production.57 South Africa found this assistance in the
World Bank.
IV. FUNDING OF THE ESKOM ELECTRICITY PROJECT: THE WORLD
BANK’S LOAN FOR MEDUPI
In March 2010, the World Bank approved a $3.75 billion loan to
South Africa to fund Eskom’s Power Investment Support Project.58 The
loan included three components, with the main focus being the
construction of a new coal-fired power plant.59 Firstly, $3.05 billion was
allocated to finance, supply, and construct the Medupi coal-fired power
station60 and associated facilities.61 Secondly, $260 million of the loan
was allocated to increasing the use of renewable energy.62 Lastly, $485
million was allotted to low-carbon energy efficiency components.63
According to the World Bank, the Project Development Objective was
to “enhance power supply and energy security in an efficient and
sustainable manner to support economic growth objectives and accelerate
South Africa’s long-term carbon mitigation strategy.”64 The country’s
energy crisis and the global financial crisis exposed South Africa’s
vulnerability to energy collapses, which it was feared would result in
further economic problems and hampered national growth.65
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)
approves loans for projects that aim to reduce poverty and promote
sustainable development in developing countries.66 Therefore, in order
to approve this loan, South Africa’s situation and Eskom’s project had to
fit within the World Bank’s six criteria for coal power projects as laid
FOR ESKOM INVESTMENT SUPPORT PROJECT THAT INCLUDES A
POWER STATION AT MEDUPI 7, 7–8 (2010).
57. See CALLDO, supra note 34, at 7–8.

LARGE COAL BURNING

58. The World Bank provided the loan through its International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development branch. See World Bank, Eskom Power Investment
Support Project Fact Sheet, 1 (May 2012), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTH
AFRICA/Resources/Eskom_Power_Investment_Support_Project_Fact_Sheet.pdf.
59. Id.
60. The Medupi power station has a capacity of 3,600–4,800 MW. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. An example of a low-carbon energy efficient component is a railway to
transport coal from the mine to the plant that would lower GHG emissions. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, THE WORLD
BANK (2011), http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTIBRD/
0,,menuPK:3046081~pagePK:64168427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:3046012,00.html.
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out in Development and Climate Change: A Strategic Framework for the
World Bank Group (DCCSF).67 The World Bank Expert Panel (Expert
Panel) 68 analyzed each criteria in relation to the proposed project plans
for Medupi.
The first requirement is that there is a demonstrated developmental
impact.69 According to the World Bank, without taking action to increase
South Africa’s energy supply, the country would face continued economic
loss and additional hardships for the country’s poor.70 Without the loan,
there would be major delays in the construction and running of the proposed
Medupi power plant.71 These delays would inhibit South Africa’s
generation capacity, compromising the security of electricity supply and
negatively affecting other SADC countries relying on South Africa’s
energy production.72 Consequently, South Africa’s economic growth would
be greatly inhibited.
The second requirement is that assistance is provided to identify and
prepare low carbon projects.73 In 2005, the Renewable Energy Strategy
set a goal of 4% renewable energy use by 2013.74 In 2006, South Africa
adopted the National Energy Efficiency Strategy, which set national targets
for improvements in energy efficiency.75 Lastly, in 2008, South Africa
committed to the Long-Term Mitigation Strategy76 in order to address
climate change as a whole.77 Therefore, South Africa had already
implemented low carbon strategies and increased energy efficiency
projects when it applied for the loan.
The third requirement is that energy sources are optimized by considering
the possibility of meeting the country’s needs through energy efficiency

67. See World Bank, supra note 58.
68. The Expert Panel is a panel of independent experts that assess the viability and
effects of a proposed project, evaluate compliance of the project with World Bank
criteria, and advise the World Bank as to its findings. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at
3.
69. Id. at 20.
70. See World Bank, supra note 58.
71. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 10.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 20.
74. Id.
75. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 5.
76. The Long-Term Mitigation Strategies included several options the country
could implement in an effort to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. See DAVIDSON, supra
note 56, at 3.
77. Id. at 5–6.
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and conservation.78 South Africa had, and continues to have, energy
efficiency programs in operation.79 Eskom currently maintains an internal
efficiency program that aims to decrease non-essential energy consumption
15% by 2015.80 South Africa, as part of its “2005 End Use Standards,”
established stringent standards for lighting, equipment, and appliances
used by certain public entities.81 The Expert Report, however, recognized
that energy efficiency measures would not make up for the increased
emissions produced by the Medupi power plant.82
The fourth and fifth requirements combined require full consideration
of viable alternatives to the least-cost options.83 When additional financing
from donors for their incremental cost is not available, the project must
use the best available and appropriate technology to allow for high
efficiency and, therefore, lower GHG emissions intensity.84 The World
Bank considered alternative sources of energy to increase electricity
production.85 These alternatives included wind power, solar power,
hydropower, and natural gas.86 However, the Expert Panel concluded
that none of the alternatives could meet the required base load.87 The
South African government also acknowledged that alternatives were not
sufficient compared to the energy production the new coal-fired plant
would provide.88
Although the Panel did not study the engineering of this project indepth, the Expert Report did recognize South Africa’s attempts to reduce
the GHG emissions that would increase from operation of the power
plant.89 To justify its desire to construct the Medupi plant, Eskom
vowed to use supercritical technology in the coal-fired power plant as
part of the project.90 Supercritical technology operates at increasingly
higher temperatures and pressures, allowing higher efficiencies and
reducing carbon dioxide emissions.91 In addition, the Report encouraged

78. Id. at 20.
79. Id. at 14.
80. Id.
81. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 15.
82. Id. at 20.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 16.
86. Id.
87. The required base load is 9,600 megawatts (MW) over five years. Id. at 20;
see also World Bank, supra note 58.
88. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 20.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 10–11.
91. See Improving Efficiencies, WORLD COAL ASS’N, http://www.worldcoal.org/coalthe-environment/coal-use-the-environment/improving-efficiencies/ (last visited Mar. 22,
2012).
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use of the highest efficiency lighting, motors, and vehicles when operating
the plant.92
The sixth requirement is an attempt to incorporate environmental
externalities in project analysis.93 In this case, with the construction of a
coal-fire power plant, negative environmental externalities could include:
effect on air pollution, damage to forests or water, and health of the
surrounding community. The Report recognized the potential, and highly
likely, increased GHG emissions resulting from the plant.94 However,
the Report combated this by suggesting that Eskom develop an effective
low carbon transition strategy.95
In conclusion, the Expert Panel determined that Eskom’s Power
Investment Support project met these six criteria. Therefore, the World
Bank approved the loan and subsequently funded the construction of the
Medupi power plant.
V. SOUTH AFRICA’S INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS AND
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS
FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC) is an international environmental treaty that was created in
1992 and has been adopted by a majority of countries.96 The objective
of the UNFCCC is to “achieve stabilization of the concentrations of
GHG in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”97 On August 29,
1997, South Africa’s government ratified the UNFCCC.98 The Kyoto
Protocol (Protocol), adopted in December 1997, is an international
92. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 14.
93. Id. at 20. Environmental externalities are effects on individuals or enterprises
that are not part of the direct decision-making process. See Alyssa Kagel, Handbook on
the Externalities, Employment, and Economics of Geothermal Energy, GEOTHERMAL ENERGY
ASS’N, i (Oct. 2006), http://www.geo-energy.org/reports/Socioeconomics%20 Guide.pdf.
94. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 4.
95. Id. at 3.
96. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771
U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
97. Id. art. 2. Countries have common but differentiated responsibilities according
to their classification as an Annex I, Annex 2, or Non-Annex country. Id. pmbl.
98. See United Nations, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, UNITED
NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/
status_of_ratification/items/2613.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
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agreement that is structured on the principles of the UNFCCC.99 The
Protocol mandates that countries stabilize their GHG emissions.100
South Africa acceded to the Kyoto Protocol in July 2002, but is classified as
a Non-Annex I country.101 As a Non-Annex I country, South Africa is
not required to meet strict targets and deadlines for emissions reductions
set by the Protocol.102 Despite the lack of stringent requirements, South
Africa has still committed to meeting targets for lower GHG emissions.103
In 2010, South Africa committed to lowering its expected GHG
emissions 34% by 2020 and 42% by 2025.104 In addition, all parties to
the UNFCCC agree to be guided by certain principles. According to
Article III:
1. The Parties should protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of human kind. . .
2. . . .
3. The Parties should take precautionary measures to
anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate
change and mitigate its adverse effects.
4. The Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development.
5. The Parties should cooperate to promote a supportive and
open international economic system that would lead to
sustainable growth and development . . . thus enabling
them better to address the problems of climate change.105
Therefore, even though the regulations of the Kyoto Protocol are not
enforceable against South Africa, the obligations and general principles
of the UNFCCC are.106 The country must abide by its commitment to
aid in the global effort to lower GHG emissions, and this begins with
making responsible decisions to reduce emissions in the country itself.
The clean development mechanism (CDM), defined by Article 12 of
the Kyoto Protocol, is one of the mechanisms South Africa uses to lower

99. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, art. 12(2), adopted Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162, [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
100. Id. art. 3. For annex I, or developed countries, the Protocol set a national target
of reducing emissions by 5% from the level of 1990 emissions of that county. Id.
101. See Sandra Gore & Claire Tucker, Getting the Deal Through–Climate
Regulation 2012–South Africa, BOWMAN GILFILLAN (Jan. 24,2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.
bowman.co.za/News-Blog/Blog/Getting-the-Deal-Through-Climate-Regulation-2012.
102. Id.
103. Id. South Africa made these commitments at the Copenhagen Summit in 2009.
Id.
104. Id.
105. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, at art. 3.
106. See Gore, supra note 101. See also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 99, art. 3.
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its carbon emissions and contribute to the global effort of GHG
stabilization.107 The CDM allows developing countries implementing
emission-reduction projects to earn certified emission reduction (CER)
credits, each of which is equivalent to one ton of CO2.108 The CER
credits earned can be sold and/or traded to developed countries in order
to assist them in meeting their emissions reduction targets assigned by
the Protocol.109 This mechanism encourages sustainable development in
developing countries without emission targets because they are able to
sell these credits and increase the country’s finances.110 In addition,
developed countries benefit from trading and selling these credits because
the credits enable these countries to meet their strict emission targets.111
In addition to its treaty obligations, South Africa, as a United Nations
member state, agreed to achieve the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG).112 These eight international development goals aim to reduce
poverty by 2015.113 The goals include: 1) eradicating extreme poverty
and hunger; 2) achieving universal primary education; 3) promoting
gender equality and empowering women; 4) reducing child mortality; 5)
improving maternal health; 6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other
diseases; 7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and 8) developing a
global partnership for development.114 The most applicable goal of the
current discussion is number seven, ensuring environmental sustainability.
In attempting to meet this goal, countries should integrate principles of
sustainable development into their policies and programs.115 According
to South Africa’s 2010 Country Report, the country will likely not meet
the timetable set for this goal.116 A specific aspect of this goal is to

107. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist
Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing
to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments
under Article 3. Kyoto Protocol supra note 99, art. 12. Currently, South Africa is
involved in 228 CDM projects. See UNFCC, supra note 96, at 3.
108. See Gore, supra note 101.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Id. at 1.
111. Id.
112. See P ALI LEHOHLA, S TATISTICIAN GENERAL, C OUNTRY R EPORT ON THE
MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 4 (2010).
113. Id. at 12.
114. Id. at 13.
115. Id. at 84.
116. Id.
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reduce CO2 emissions to 8.4 metric tons per capita by 2015.117 South
Africa’s 2010 Country Report classifies the CO2 emissions target
achievability as “possible,” not “likely.”118 The same year this Country
Report indicated that South Africa was not on track to meet goal seven
and had only a chance to meet its CO2 emission target, the country
requested and received a loan to fund a power plant that would increase
CO2 emissions.
Although South Africa is not currently restricted by the Protocol’s
international regulatory obligations for GHG emissions, the country has
clearly demonstrated its intention to set and meet emission reduction
targets and contribute to the global effort to stabilize and reduce the
release of GHG. In addition, the country committed to the 2015 MDG
that included a specific obligation to promote environmental sustainability.
Consequently, while South Africa clearly committed to positive climate
change and emissions reduction, the country’s plan to build a new coalfired power plant works against these goals. When examined closely,
the World Bank appears to have altered the definition of its loan criteria
in order to allow Eskom’s Power Investment Support Project to meet
those guidelines. The South African government’s decision to build
Medupi, which was made feasible by the World Bank’s loan, is
inconsistent with the general principles that the country agreed to abide
by as a signatory to the UNFCCC. A conflict therefore arises, and a
solution is necessary, when an international financial institution makes a
decision to support a country that is inconsistent with a United Nations
treaty of which that country is a member.
VI. THE COAL CONFLICT AND THE REGULATORY SOLUTION
Solar power, wind power, nuclear power, biomass, geothermal,
hydropower, coal, oil, and natural gas are all viable sources of energy.
From this list, coal is inherently the highest-polluter and most carbonintensive energy source when used for electricity production.119 The
level of carbon dioxide emissions produced as a direct result of burning
coal for electricity production ranges from 790 to 1017 grams of
CO2/kilowatt hours (kWh).120 This is compared to 362 to 575 grams of

117. See LEHOHLA, supra note 112, at 85.
118. Id.
119. See Coal and Climate Change Facts, CTR. FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,
http://www.c2es.org/global-warming-basics/coalfacts.cfm (last visited Mar. 22, 2012).
120. See Comparative Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Power Generation, WORLD
N UCLEAR ASS ’ N , http://www.world-nuclear.org/education/comparativeco2.html (last
visited Mar. 22, 2012).
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CO2/kWh for use of gas.121 In addition, hydro, solar, wind, and nuclear
resources are not burned in order to produce electricity, and therefore
they do not emit as much CO2.122 It therefore seems contradictory for a
country that is bound by UNFCCC obligations and committed to Kyoto’s
global effort to reduce GHG emissions to receive a loan from the World
Bank for construction of a new coal-fired power plant as opposed to a
less carbon intensive solution.
A. South Africa’s Allocation of the World Bank Loan to the Medupi
Power Plant Violates its UNFCCC Obligations
As a Member to the UNFCCC, South Africa should not receive the
portion of the World Bank loan dedicated to the Medupi power plant. In
signing and ratifying the UNFCCC, South Africa agreed to abide by the
rules and principles of the treaty. It committed, as a signatory, to reduce
the amount of GHG emissions it produced in order to contribute to the
global effort under the UNFCCC to “stabiliz[e] GHG concentrations in
the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system.”123 Requesting, receiving, and
allocating $3.05 billion for a new coal-fired power plant diverges from
the commitments it made under the UNFCCC and violates its obligations
under such treaty.
Medupi is the fourth largest coal power plant in the world.124 Once
operative, the Medupi power plant will emit approximately 25 million
tons of CO2 a year; this is more CO2 than 135 countries will each
produce that same year.125 In fact, if the Medupi power plant were
considered a country, it would rank 77th out of 212 countries in carbon
dioxide emissions.126 In addition, the plant will extract water127 from
already strained sources within the country.128
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, art. 2.
124. See Zachary Shahan, World Bank OKs $3B for World’s 4th Largest Coal
Power Plant, Ecopolitology (Apr. 10, 2010), http://ecopolitology.org/2010/04/10/worldbank-oks-3b-for-worlds-4th-largest-coal-power-plant/.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. During electricity production, coal-fired power plants use water to extract,
wash and transport coal, cool steam emitted during electricity production, and control
pollution from the power plant. See How it Works: Water for Coal, UNION OF CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS, http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_energy/our-energy-choices/energy-and-water-
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According to UNFCCC Article 3(1), South Africa should strive for
inter-generational equality in the climate system.129 Construction of the
world’s fourth largest coal-fired power plant is not a commitment to
protection of the climate in the present, nor the future. Once the Medupi
power plant is up and running, South Africa has a peak, plateau, and decline
trajectory for GHG emissions. According to a Presidential announcement,
the government would implement “a range of voluntary nationally
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) to ensure that the country’s
emissions deviate below ‘Business as Usual’ (BAU) baselines.”130
Consequently, this strategy would cause emissions to peak from 2020 to
2025, stabilize for a decade, and only then begin to decline.131 The peak
of GHG emissions in South Africa, reaching over 600 million tons,132 is
unnecessary. Even though the government plans to make concerted
efforts to reduce GHG emissions 35 years from now, the solution to the
country’s energy issues does not require this immense increase in emissions.
In addition, under the UNFCCC, member countries should make
efforts to reduce global GHG emissions. However, South Africa’s peak,
plateau, and decline trajectory is focused solely on South Africa, rather
than cooperating as a Member country in reducing global GHG
emissions. In spite of the government’s plan to lower South Africa’s GHG
emissions in the future, the increased emissions Medupi will produce in
the present are antagonistic to the efforts of UNFCCC countries.
Accordingly, South Africa not only violated its individual obligations
under Article 3(1) of the treaty, it violated its Article 3(5) and Article 4
commitment to cooperate with other countries in the effort to reduce or
prevent emissions of GHG.

use/water-energy-electricity-coal.html (last visited Feb. 5, 2013). Therefore, coal-fired
power plants significantly impact surrounding water sources. Id.
128. See Khadija Sharife, South Africa’s Dirty Secret: Eskom and the Medupi
Power Plant, PAMBAZUKA NEWS, (May 13, 2010), http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/
features/64410/print.
129. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, art. 3(1).
130. See D EP ’ T OF E NVTL A FFAIRS , R EPUBLIC OF S OUTH A FRICA, Ref.
BCC11/06/01/01, DEFINING SOUTH AFRICA’S PEAK, PLATEU AND DECLINE GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSION TRAJECTORY (2011). “Business as Usual” is a baseline concept used to
measure the results of certain GHG emissions reduction methods. See Patricia Nelson,
An African Dimension to the Clean Development Mechanism: Finding a Path to
Sustainable Development in the Energy Sector, 32 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 615, 635
(2004). The BAU baseline provides the amount of emissions that would be produced if
reduction methods were not implemented. Id. Emissions produced after implementing a
reduction measure can then be compared to the BAU baseline to study the effects of the
methods. Id.
131. See DEP’T OF ENVTL AFFAIRS, supra note 130, at 1.
132. Id.
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In compliance with Article 3(3), South Africa should anticipate, prevent,
or minimize negative effects on climate change.133 South Africa knew
of the negative effect the Medupi power plant would have on climate
change via increased CO2 emissions. The country also has the ability to
utilize other forms of energy and minimize emission of CO2 using
additional technology. South Africa’s actions did the opposite of preventing
and minimizing these known negative effects.
Eskom and the South African government did attempt to cancel out
the increased GHG emissions that Medupi would produce. The attempt
to balance out the negative effects of coal use is evidenced by Eskom’s
allocation of portions of the World Bank loan to funding the use of
sustainable resources and methods dedicated to low carbon efficiency.
Although the Medupi plant’s use of coal will have a detrimental effect
on the environment, Eskom does attempt to lessen the harsh effects by
using supercritical coal technology. In the spirit of the UNFCCC, the
loan will fund the technology that will allow for cleaner and more efficient
burning of coal, subsequently reducing the amount of potential emissions.
Additionally, a portion of the loan is allocated for renewable energy.134
The money will help to finance the 100 MW Sere Wind Power Project
and the 100 MW Upington Concentrating Solar Power Project.135 Lastly,
Eskom will have $485 million to spend on low-carbon energy efficiency
components of the project.136 These components include the Majuba Rail
Project137 and technical assistance used for reviewing opportunities to
increase coal-fired power plant efficiency opportunities.138
While these components are steps in the right direction, the attempt to
control and/or lessen Medupi emissions is nowhere close to making up
for the amount of CO2 the plant will produce. The desire for cheap
sources of electricity is understandable in a country in need of a stable
energy supply; the increased demand for electricity has depleted the
country’s ability to supply it, and resolution is imperative. In a country
attempting to grow its economy and bridge a huge socioeconomic gap,
an ample supply of energy resources is mandatory. However, South
133. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, art. 3(3).
134. $206 million is allocated to renewable energy. See World Bank, supra note
58.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Transporting coal using a railway car helps decrease the amount of emissions
released during transportation. Id.
138. Id.
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Africa is not making decisions that are in the best interest of its country
in the long-term.
Even though coal may appear to be a simpler and cheaper solution,
further investment in alternative, renewable energy sources139 is the best
avenue for long-term growth, stabilization, and equality. More importantly,
use of renewable energy sources would comply with the country’s treaty
obligations and work towards meeting the MDG to which it agreed. In
addition, Medupi is not being structured to allow for the retrofitting of
carbon capture and storage.140 Eskom, the South African government,
and the World Bank all acknowledged the negative effect Medupi would
have on climate change. Not taking as many steps as possible to limit
and prevent the negative effects of Medupi is a violation of Article 3(3)
and the obligations South Africa committed to as a signatory of the
UNFCCC and participant in the MDG.
According to Article 3(4), South Africa should promote sustainable
development, allowing it to successfully deal with climate change
problems.141 Building another coal-fired power plant does not encourage
sustainable development. The majority of this loan will allow further
burning of coal, increasing GHG emissions both now and in the future.
If South Africa wanted to comply with the UNFCCC, it would apply the
$3 billion to the second and third components of Eskom’s project.142
The South African government continuously argues that alternative sources
of energy are too expensive; yet $3 billion is a significant amount of
money. Instead of enabling the production of 25 million tons of CO2 a
year, that sum of money could be, and should be, allocated to more
environmentally friendly resources and projects. Although the government
feels otherwise, tapping into renewable energy sources is necessary and
financially feasible.
Wind and solar power are more expensive energy sources to utilize,
but the cost is worth it. Using China as an example of a proactive response
to energy issues, one can understand the potential that South Africa has
to exploit resources that not only comply with treaty obligations, but
also provide a better future for its citizens143 and a greener environment
for the world. South Africa and China are both characterized as developing
countries as well as emerging global powers.144 China’s population

139. Examples of renewable energy sources include wind and solar power.
140. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 11.
141. See UNFCCC, supra note 96, art. 4(4).
142. The second and third components refer to wind and solar power and lowcarbon efficiency, respectively.
143. This includes creating jobs and improving the economy.
144. Id.
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outnumbers South Africa’s by 1.25 billion people.145 However, China’s
five tons of emissions per capita is less than South Africa’s twenty tons
of emissions per capita.146 In order to establish energy security, China
constructed over 10,000 wind turbines in Beijing, which produced almost
14,000 MW of energy.147 In addition, the manufacturing, installation,
operation, and maintenance of these turbines created over 200,000 jobs.148
This same project could have produced more than half of South Africa’s
energy supply as well as provided employment opportunities and energy
security.149
According to the CEO of Eskom, Mpho Makwana, South Africa
possesses the potential to affordably tap into 5,000 MW of power using
2,500 2MW wind turbines over a four-year period.150 When wind turbines
are used for energy production, the turbines do not omit any CO2 and
would significantly contribute to lowering both South Africa’s and the
world’s GHG emissions. The South African government still argues that
use of alternative forms of energy is presently too expensive. From a
numerical viewpoint, however, the Medupi power plant project’s capital
cost is $3.5 billion more than the potential capital cost of Mpho
Makwana’s acknowledged 5,000 MW wind turbine project.151 This
difference represents almost the entire amount of the World Bank loan to
Eskom.
Although South Africa has implemented several wind farm projects,
these projects are considered merely “experimental.”152 Instead, South
Africa should treat wind and solar power as priorities. Mpho Makwana
acknowledged that South Africa has the ability to administer windpowered electricity production. In addition, South Africa’s geographical
location makes it a prime country to exploit solar power. If South Africa
took the money loaned for coal-fired power and invested it in natural
resources that are less carbon intensive, the country would be able to
145. See Sharife, supra note 128.
146. Id.
147. Id. The turbines allowed Beijing to increase wind power generation by 124%
in 2009. Id.
148. Id. “The European Wind Energy Association (EWEA) estimates that from
commissioning to construction, wind power generate[s] 15 jobs per MW.” Id.
149. Id.
150. See Sharife, supra note 128. Mpho Makwana made this statement on January
22, 2010 to the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA). Id.
151. See Sharife, supra note 128. The cost of Medupi so far totals $16.6 billion. Id.
152. Id. Klipheuwel, which cost $5 million to build, produces power for 2,500
households. Id.

243

BOTTERILL

2/1/2016 3:15 PM

comply with its commitments to the UNFCCC, move closer to achieving
its MDG, and simultaneously bridge the nation’s enormous socioeconomic
gap.153 Refusal to exploit available sources of cleaner, sustainable energy
and a disregard of technology to decrease CO2 emissions is a violation of
the general principles of the UNFCCC.
B. The Need for Enforceable International Treaty Obligations
South Africa’s behavior, as described thus far, is in violation of its
obligations under the UNFCCC. The problem is that enforceability is
lacking. Treaties are international agreements that impose obligations on
countries that sign and ratify the agreement.154 Treaties may be binding
and enforceable against a country that violates the treaty’s principles and
mandated obligations.155 The UNFCCC is enforceable against South Africa
and consequences should be imposed in response to the country’s violation
of its climate change obligations.
South Africa has masked its decision to use coal with the idea of
alleviating poverty. It has sold the power plant as the most beneficial,
and possibly only, method to increase electricity while simultaneously
reducing poverty. It is clear that there is a need for a quick fix to South
Africa’s lack of energy supply. The South African government and leaders
of Eskom, however, are being narrow-minded and financially selfinterested. There are alternative, and more beneficial, avenues for
solving the country’s electricity problem.
Combining the commitment to renewable energy with demand-side
management would enable South Africa to meet its energy needs while
also complying with its treaty obligations to reduce GHG emissions.
During the process of increasing wind and solar electricity production
capabilities, South Africa can turn to the people, the consumers, to address
the problem from the demand side. Through demand-side management,
the demand for energy can be decreased by providing incentives and
education that encourage consumers to use less energy during peak
times.156 When the demand lessens, the pressure to supply such large
amounts of electricity decreases. This strategy will provide South Africa
the ability and time to implement renewable energy projects, ensure
energy sustainability, and cut its reliance on less expensive, but injurious
coal. In addition, this strategy will reduce poverty now and in the long
153. Investment in less carbon intensive natural resources would bridge the
socioeconomic gap by creating more job opportunities and ensuring energy security.
154. See WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, TREATY (2005), available at
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/treaty.aspx#2.
155. Id.
156. See ROB STEPHEN, ENERGY EFFICIENCY MADE SIMPLE 23 (2009).
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run by creating thousands of job opportunities, sparking outside
investment interest in the country, and providing a healthier environment
for the country’s people. Incentive, or enforcement of law, is essential
in ensuring that countries make these responsible decisions.
In South Africa’s case, enforceability should entail denial of the portion
of the loan allocated to Medupi. In addition, South Africa should pay a
fine into a United Nations fund, dedicated to climate change prevention,
for violating the global commitment to GHG reductions. Without
enforceability of treaty obligations, signing and ratifying the agreement
holds no purpose. By allowing South Africa to represent itself as
committed to global GHG emissions, and then permitting the use of a
$3.05 billion loan to fund a gigantic coal-fired power plant, a mockery is
made of the UNFCCC. South Africa, under the guise of an immediate
need for electricity and alleviation of poverty, would be free to make
decisions that, when reviewed closely, are not beneficial to the country
as a whole and lack compliance with obligatory treaty commitments.
South Africa is manipulating the system to appear committed to the
global climate, while simultaneously doing what is financially best for the
government.
C. Holding the World Bank Accountable for Enabling
South Africa’s Violation
In the solutions proposed thus far, the World Bank has not been held
directly accountable. Alteration or denial of the loan are some mechanisms
of oversight with respect to the World Bank’s actions, yet there are no
legal ramifications for the institution. The World Bank’s financial
power to fund large, country-wide projects necessitates the ability to
hold the institution accountable for projects it funds that violate the
rights of a country, its citizens, and/or its other treaty obligations.
At the project level, accountability for complaints against the World
Bank is enforced via the World Bank Inspection Panel (IP) and Compliance
Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO).157 These quasi-judicial systems provide
review mechanisms of Bank-supported projects when someone feels
harmed by such a project.158 Further, the World Bank is required to
157. See Alnoor Ebrahim & Steve Herz, Accountability in Complex Organizations:
World Bank Responses to Civil Society 9 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 08027, 2007).
158. Id. at 10.
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disclose policy information and maintain public information centers.159
These attempts at accountability are insufficient and additional means of
holding the World Bank liable for injurious Bank-funded projects are
essential.
Firstly, the IP is merely a chance for people’s voices to be heard;
affirmative actions implementing legal liability require more.160 Although it
is important for society to be able to voice its opinions to a large
institution, the absence of legal liability makes the regulatory process futile.
Secondly, the CAO is an independent group that reports complaints to
the President of the World Bank.161 The CAO then informs the World
Bank Board of compliance findings before submitting an Annual Report
disclosing these issues.162 Reviewing a complaint and publishing that
complaint is not a substantial accountability mechanism. In addition, a
review of a complaint can appear to comply with World Bank policies.
However, as seen in the Medupi loan requirement, these policies and
criteria can be expanded to allow compliance, even when the heart of the
action is harmful.
As stated in Section IV, the World Bank has certain criteria a
proposed project must meet in order for that country to secure a project
loan. In the case of South Africa, those criteria were expanded. In its
Final Report, the experts concluded that the project met the criteria but
then stated “the World Bank must commit itself to supporting the South
African government’s efforts to improve energy efficiency on a scale
that matches its commitment to Medupi.”163 In addition, in its assessment
of criteria four, the Expert Panel concluded that no alternative options
were viable except for coal, then subsequently stated “however . . . we
stress the need to develop other, cleaner, options for the future.”164 The
World Bank’s Expert Panel knew of the effect Medupi would have on
the climate and still approved the loan. The Expert Panel avoided the
clear damage Medupi would have by putting the focus on South Africa
figuring out cleaner energy production methods in the future. This
shows a disregard for the immediate detrimental impact of Medupi and
places the responsibility for the future impact on the country. If a
complaint were filed with the current enforceability measures in place,
an Inspection Panel would justify the loan using the Expert Panels Final
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id.
See The World Bank Group, About the CAO: Governance, COMPLIANCE
ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/about/governance/ (last visited
Apr. 3, 2012).
163. See DAVIDSON, supra note 56, at 20.
164. Id.
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Report. Accountability for the acknowledged injurious effect of Medupi
is lacking unless those not internally involved in the company have the
power to hold the World Bank responsible for these decisions.
Although the World Bank has the underlying objective of helping
developing countries, the institution benefits financially from these loan
transactions as well. Therefore, there is an incentive to approve and
fund these projects; a disincentive to abuse this power is what is lacking.
Accordingly, affirmative enforcement measures are required. The
people should be able to take judicial action when a Bank-funded project
causes harm to society. The community as a whole or other nongovernmental organizations should be able to bring a suit against the
World Bank. If initiation of a lawsuit is limited to the government, this
measure would be ineffective. For example, in the Medupi loan situation,
the South African government requested and benefitted from the loan.
The government had no reason, therefore, to take action against the
World Bank. The citizens of South Africa, however, were harmed by
the loan because of its unhealthy consequences, the violation of the
country’s treaty obligations, and the hindrance on accomplishing the
MDG. As a result of the deleterious effects upon the country, the nation,
via its people or another organization, should have the ability to turn to
litigation against the World Bank in order to stop the harmful project and
provide an incentive to prevent future approval of injurious projects.165
D. Regulation is Needed to Prevent Inconsistencies Between
International Institutions
There is clearly a conflict in the obligations required of the
international institutions involved in South Africa’s building of Medupi.
South Africa is mired between its United Nations obligations for GHG
reductions and the World Bank’s loan enabling the increase of CO2
emissions. Why would a company not accept billions of dollars from an
international institution (i.e. The World Bank) that is willing to provide
such a loan, when there is no disincentive in doing so?
South Africa is a Member state of the United Nations. The country
committed to the UNFCCC and its global effort to reduce GHG emissions
and to create a sustainable future. It then violated the general principles
of the UNFCCC by requesting and devoting billions of dollars to a

165.

For example, injunctions preventing the loan, fines, etc.
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power plant that would produce more CO2 emissions than some countries
do in a year. Regardless of any perceived violations of the UNFCCC, it
is not surprising that a country in great need would accept funding from
the World Bank when given the opportunity.
In addition to the United Nations, the World Bank is another
international institution involved in the controversial behavior of South
Africa. Disguised as a solution to poverty, the World Bank provided a
loan for the Medupi power plant that would significantly increase South
Africa’s GHG emissions. The relationship between the United Nations
and the World Bank, as it relates to South Africa, is analogous to one
parent telling you not to do something while the other parent gives you
money to do that very thing.
This controversy calls for regulations in order to prevent inconsistencies
between international institutions. As stated above, a necessary response
to South Africa’s treaty violation is to prevent the country from securing
the loan dedicated to financing Medupi. However, there is currently no
binding authority that allows such an action to be taken. Therefore,
regulations are needed when one international body has imposed regulations
on a country that creates a counterproductive relationship with another
international body.
First, there should be preventative regulations. The United Nations
should have a broad set of criteria or list of limitations for what a
country is allowed to do once it signs an obligatory treaty. When an
international institution provides a loan for, or in some way is involved
in, a country’s project that is related to the subject matter of a binding
treaty, such institution would be required to confirm that its actions
comply with the United Nations’ list of criteria. In this case, even though
the World Bank found that South Africa met its DCCSF criteria, the
World Bank should have taken an additional step. The World Bank
would have reviewed its loan approval in accordance with United Nations
criteria related to the UNFCCC treaty. Most likely, this loan would have
been denied. Alternatively, the World Bank could have been instructed
to reallocate the loan to additional sustainable development efforts and
energy resources.
Second, in the case of a conflict, there should be enforcement regulations.
The United Nations, via its Security Council, should have the ability to
intervene in the country’s incompatible relationship or action with
another international body when it concerns a binding treaty. This is not
a suggestion that the United Nations take another international institution to
court. Rather, it should have the ability to veto, comment on, or otherwise
be involved in the distribution of loans or approval of money by institutions
when such actions conflict with a country’s treaty obligations. In this
case, the United Nations, via the power of the UNFCCC, would have
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reviewed this loan. It then would have had the ability to veto the loan,
or at the very least make enforceable decisions on the reallocation of the
money to sources that would comply with South Africa’s treaty obligations.
VII. CONCLUSION
South Africa’s governmental changes have played an important role in
the county’s energy policy. The increase in housing for the nation’s
most impoverished section of the population resulted in a huge increase
in demand for electricity. The increase in electricity demand resulted in
a decrease in energy supply. To resolve these issues, the South African
government turned to the cheap but harmful solution of coal as an
energy source for electricity production.
Coal is the most carbon-intensive energy source when used to generate
electricity. Therefore, the construction of a power plant dedicated to
burning coal for electricity production is not ideal for a country that is a
signatory to the UNFCCC. The request for and use of billions of dollars
to construct this power plant was a violation of South Africa’s treaty
obligations and a hindrance to accomplishing the MDG. The country,
however, had no incentive to refuse this money when it was in need of a
quick fix for their electricity crisis.
Using alleviation of poverty as the rationale, the International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development approved and provided a loan to
South Africa for over $3 billion dollars for construction of the Medupi
coal-fired power plant. This single power plant would produce more
CO2 emissions in one year than entire countries do in that same period of
time. Therefore, South Africa’s decisions caused a conflict between two
international organizations.
To address this conflict and prevent future issues, several actions are
required. First, the obligations imposed on a Member country to a treaty
need to be enforced. Secondly, the United Nations should adopt
preventative regulations that international institutions must comply with
when making agreements or loans to a country that is a signatory to a
relevant treaty. If a conflict occurs, consequences should be mandatory.
Whether these consequences involve blocking of a loan or binding
decisions on restructuring of an agreement, the United Nations should
have review power over actions taken that conflict with enforceable
international treaties. Lastly, the people harmed by a project should be
able to bring suit against the financial institution that enables such
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actions. Without affirmative legal action, there is no true disincentive to
fund other injurious projects in the future.
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VII. APPENDICES166
APPENDIX A167

166. A comparison of the 2003 and 2011 electricity bills shows the dramatic
increase and fluctuation of electricity prices in South Africa over an 8-year period. This
is a 985.57 Rand difference in electricity bills for the same home and same number of
residents.
167. 2003 Eskom electricity bill of Cape Town, South Africa resident. The total
amount due equals 269.10 Rand.
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APPENDIX B168

168. 2011 Eskom electricity bill of Cape Town, South Africa resident. The total
amount due equals 1,254.67 Rand.

252

